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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Anthony Childers contended that the district court erred when it denied his 
request for a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. He demonstrated that, 
not only was his mental condition a significant issue at sentencing, but that the 
information in the record did not satisfy all the requirements set forth in the statute. 
Without that evidence, the district court's decision to forgo the psychiatric evaluation 
constituted an abuse of discretion by failing to meet its statutory obligation. The State's 
only responses are: first, the mental conditions were not an underlying factor in the 
crime and, thus, not an issue at sentencing (ignoring the evidence in the record that his 
mental conditions were part of the reason for his substance abuse, which was a direct 
underlying factor of his actions); second, regardless of the lack of evidence speaking to 
the availability of treatment options for Mr. Childers' conditions and the risks and 
benefits thereof, the record satisfied the statutory requirements; and third, the timing of 
the request should, for convenience's sake, trump the mandatory requirement 
established by the Legislature in the relevant statute. 
The State's arguments are markedly unpersuasive, as they ignore the evidence 
in the record, as well as the requirements in the statute. As such, they do not 
undermine Mr. Childers's arguments, which reveal the error in the district court's 
decision. This Court should remedy that error. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Childers' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it failed to order the requested 
psychiatric evaluation? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Order The Requested 
Psychiatric Evaluation 
A. Introduction 
The district court's decision to deny Mr. Childers' request for an evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 was erroneous for two reasons. First, as the evidence in the 
record demonstrates, Mr. Childers's mental conditions played a role in the underlying 
offenses and he made that factor an issue at sentencing. Therefore, I.C. § 19-2522 
mandated a conforming evaluation. Second, the other evaluations included in the 
record contain incomplete discussions of the availability of treatment for Mr. Childers' 
conditions, and particularly, do not contain any discussion about the risks and benefits 
of treatment as opposed to nontreatment, both of which are required by the statute. 
Therefore, I.C. § 19-2522 obligated the district court to order a conforming evaluation 
prior to imposing a sentence on Mr. Childers. As such, regardless of the timing of the 
request, the district court was required by statute to order the conforming psychiatric 
evaluation and the failure to do so constituted an abuse of its discretion at sentencing. 
B. Mr. Childers' Mental Conditions Were A Factor At Sentencing, Which The District 
Court Was Required To Consider 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 not just 
suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a 
sentencing factor when it was a significant factor in the offense. Hollon v. State, 132 
Idaho 573, 581 (1999). The evidence in the record is clear that Mr. Childers' actions 
occurred while he was under the influence of alcohol. (Psychosexual Evaluation 
(hereinafter, PE), pp.2-3.) The record is also clear that one of the causes of 
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Mr. Childers' alcohol abuse is potentially his mental conditions, as he may use alcohol 
to self-medicate for his mental conditions. 1 (PE, p.18.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Childers' attorney established that Mr. Childers' mental 
condition would be a factor to be considered at sentencing when Mr. Childers pied 
guilty: "I think as far as mental health, if the psychosexual should pick up anything, if 
there looks to be a need after that we'll ask at that point." (Tr., p.22, Ls.21-24.) The 
district court permitted this course of action, reserving its decision to order additional 
evaluations "depending on what shows up [in the psychosexual evaluation]." (Tr., p.22, 
L.21 - p.23, L.1.) The State did not object to this procedure. (See general!y 
Tr., pp.22-23.) And when the psychosexual evaluation returned with a recommendation 
for a psychiatric evaluation in order to determine the availability and potential benefits of 
treatment that it could not address (required for the record by I.C. § 19-2522), defense 
counsel invoked the reserved request, reaffirming that Mr. Childers' mental condition 
would be a factor in the imposition of sentence: "[t]his is a case where [the 
prosecutor] is going to recommend that the Court impose sentence. The indication from 
Dr. Hatzenbuehler is that she believes there could be things that are not picked up by 
her evaluation. I think under those circumstances the Court is better taken to order 
such an evaluation at this time." (Tr., p.28, Ls.5-10.) Basically, defense counsel's 
1 As the psychosexual evaluator pointed out, she was not able to determine to what 
extent that was the case without the psychiatric evaluation. (See PE, p.18.) The State 
ignores this evidence in the record, which connects Mr. Childers' mental condition to his 
alcohol abuse, and argues that his alcohol abuse alone was the underlying factor to be 
considered. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) Additionally, this position would lead to an 
inappropriate and impractical rule for the courts to apply in future cases, as it would 
essentially allow for the artificial separation of a physical action from its motivational 
component. 
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request indicates that the mental health issues would be mitigating in nature, thus 
countering the prosecutor's request for imprisonment, and therefore, the mental health 
issues needed to be sufficiently considered by the district court before it imposed 
Mr. Childers' sentence. As such, Mr. Childers' mental condition was put before the 
district court as a significant sentencing issue, one which could potentially mean the 
difference between incarceration or another, more lenient alternative. 
Because Mr. Childers' mental conditions were necessarily a significant factor in 
the alleged acts and in the sentencing determination, the district court was statutorily 
obligated to consider Mr. Childers' mental conditions (meaning that it could not, within 
its discretion, refuse to consider Mr. Childers' mental conditions). I.C. § 19-2523; 
Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581. There is no exception in the statute for "minor," as opposed 
to "major" mental conditions, see generally I.C. § 19-2523, as the district court seemed 
to believe. (See Tr., p.28, Ls.11-21.) Regardless, the district court's assertion that 
there was no indication of some major mental illness or some overriding psychiatric 
diagnosis in the record is clearly erroneous because the Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI) also reveals that both Bipolar Disorder and Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) both major mental illnesses,2 were potentially affecting 
Mr. Childers. (PSI, p.11.) This also further demonstrates why the district court was 
2 Bipolar disorder is a mental disorder with severe, potentially-life-altering symptoms. 
See National Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 
"Bipolar Disorder," p.1 (2008), http://mentalhealth.gov/health/publications/bipolar-
disorder/nimh-bipolar-adults.pdf. ADHD, as one of the most common mental disorders, 
is also a major mental health condition, which has the potential to cause the patient 
lifelong challenges. See National Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and 
Human Services, "Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), p.1 (2008), 
http://mentalhealth.gov/health/publications/attention-deficit-hyperactivity-disorder/ 
adhd_booklet.pdf. 
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statutorily obligated to order a psychiatric evaluation prior to imposing sentence. See 
I.C. § 19-2522. 
C. Because The District Court Was Statutorily Obligated To Consider Mr. Childers' 
Mental Condition, It Was Also Statutorily Obligated To Ensure The Record 
Contained Evidence Of The Treatment Options, Risks, And Benefits, Which It 
Failed To Do 
While the district court does have some discretion over whether to order a 
psychiatric evaluation, once it is clear that the defendant's mental condition is a 
significant factor, that discretion is limited by the statutory obligations imposed by the 
Legislature in I.C. §§ 19-2522 and -2523.3 The district court was required to ensure that 
the record contained "[a] consideration of whether treatment is available for the 
defendant's mental condition; [and a)n analysis of the relative risks and benefits of 
treatment or nontreatment." I.C. § 19-2522(3)(d)-(e). In fact, the Court of Appeals has 
already held that "the statute requires that the evaluation be conducted before 
sentencing so that the trial court will have the benefit of the evaluator's insights in 
fashioning an appropriate sentence." State v. Banbury, 145 Idaho 265, 269 (Ct. App. 
2007) (quoting State v. Coonts, 137 Idaho 150, 153 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
The record actually contains a clear statement that there is insufficient evidence 
therein to satisfy the statute's requirements: "I would also recommend that he have a 
psychiatric evaluation to determine if psychotropic medications would be of benefit to 
him." (PE, p.18 (emphasis added).) Dr. Hatzenbuehler informed the district court that 
there was a potential treatment alternative, the benefits of which could not be sufficiently 
3 I.C. § 19-2522 establishes the requirements for the necessary psychiatric evaluation 
itself. I.C. § 19-2523 sets forth the factors the district court must consider in regard to 
the defendant's specific condition. 
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considered (as required by I.C. § 19-2522(3)(e)) without a psychiatric evaluation. 
(See PE, p.18.) 
The State attempts to justify the district court's failure to comply with the statute 
by pointing to the recommendations from the substance abuse evaluation and the 
psychosexual evaluation. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) Neither evaluation, however, contains 
any discussion of the potential benefits Mr. Childers could receive from a psychotropic 
medication regimen; nor do they discuss the risks and benefits of not providing him 
such medication. (See generally PE, GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary 
(hereinafter, GRRS).) Therefore, none of the evidence upon which the State relies can 
satisfy the statutory obligation placed on the district court in this regard. Compare 
Banbury, 145 Idaho at 269-70 (wherein the Court of Appeals, in a similar situation, 
found that the other evaluations in the record did not address the factors set forth for 
consideration in I.C. § 19-2522, and thus, the district court erred by not ordering the 
additional, necessary evaluation). 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has held that the record "must satisfy the 
criteria set out in I.C. § 19-2522(3)." State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879 (Ct. App. 
1994) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, it has reaffirmed that stance, holding that, in 
this regard, "[a] district court's election not to order a psychological evaluation will be 
upheld on appeal if ... the information already before the court adequately met the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3)." State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822 (Ct. App. 
2010). These holdings lead to only one conclusion: where the record fails to satisfy the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3), the district court's decision to not order the required 
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evaluation constitutes an abuse of its discretion.4 See id.; McFarland, 125 Idaho at 879. 
The need for such information is important because the presentence investigator is also 
obligated to make a "recommendation regarding a psychological examination and a 
plan of rehabilitation." I.C.R. 32(b)(10) (emphasis added).5 Just as the district court in 
this case was unable to fulfill its obligation to ensure a satisfactory and complete record 
without the requested psychiatric evaluation, so too was the presentence investigator 
unable to fulfill her obligation under the Idaho Criminal Rules without that evaluation. 
Without information regarding a potentially-critical part of Mr. Childers' prognosis, 
the presentence investigator could not provide an adequate plan of rehabilitation, or 
consequently, an adequate recommendation for sentencing. 
Furthermore, the request was made as soon as possible, given when the 
psychosexual evaluation was provided to the district court and counsel. According to 
defense counsel, he had no opportunity to discuss the recommendation for a psychiatric 
evaluation with his client before the sentencing hearing. (Tr., p.26, L.16 - p.27, L.4.) 
As such, the motion was made as timely as possible, and the State's contention that it 
was not timely is meritless, particularly since the State's representative below did 
not object to the reservation by either defense counsel or the district court of their 
decisions in regard to a potential psychiatric evaluation until after receiving and 
reviewing the psychosexual evaluation. (See Resp. Br., p.12.) Regardless, "defense 
4 This is particularly true since Mr. Childers actually requested the preparation of this 
necessary evaluation, pointing out the insufficiency in the record to the district court. 
Compare Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 823; State v. Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, 731 (Ct. App. 
2011). 
5 The district court's discretion regarding psychiatric evaluations is guided by both 
I.C. § 19-2522 and I.C.R. 32. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822. 
9 
counsel's lack of diligence do not, however, excuse the trial court from compliance with 
§ 19-2522." Coonts, 127 Idaho at 153 (Ct. App. 2002). And, as in Coonts, the district 
court's failure to comply with its statutory obligation demands action by this Court. 
Compare id.; Banbury, 145 Idaho at 269-270. 
Additionally, since the obligation imposed on the district court is mandated by 
I.C. § 19-2522, the district court's discretion to regulate its calendar is irrelevant. 
(See Resp. Br., p.15 (citing Dep't of Labor and Indus. Serv. v. East Idaho Mills, Inc., 111 
Idaho 137, 138-39 (Ct. App. 1986).) This is because the statute uses the mandatory (as 
opposed to the permissive) instruction of "shall."6 For example, "If there is reason to 
believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing 
and for good cause shown, the court shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist 
or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the 
defendant. ... The report of the examination shall include the following: .... " I.C. § 19-
2522(1) and (3) (emphasis added). As such, whatever discretion the district court may 
have with regard to the control of its calendar,7 that discretion is limited by the statutory 
mandate with regard to the necessary psychiatric evaluation. See I.C. § 19-2522. The 
6 "[The Idaho Supreme Court] has interpreted the meaning of the word 'may' appearing 
in legislation, as having the meaning or expressing the right to exercise discretion. 
When used in a statute, the word 'may' is permissive rather than the imperative 
or mandatory meaning of 'must' or 'shall."' Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848 
(1995) (citations omitted); see also Twin Falls County v. Idaho Comm'n on Redistricting, 
152 Idaho 346, 350 (2012). 
7 The authority to which the State cites for this assertion arose under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 16 governing pre-trial activities. East Idaho Mills, 111 Idaho at 136-37. Even 
if a parallel could be drawn between the district court's discretion regarding its calendar 
in criminal, as opposed to civil, matters (for example, the defendant's constitutional right 
to a speedy trial could impact the district court's unfettered ability to control its calendar 
or do substantial justice in the case), the critical fact in Mr. Childers' case is that it deals 
with a post-conviction issue, not a pre-trial issue. 
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district court was required to order a psychiatric evaluation before it imposed 
Mr. Childers' sentence. Banbury, 145 Idaho at 269-70. And in regard to the presence 
of the victim and her family, while their presence is noteworthy, their presence does not 
create an exception to the district court's statutory obligation.8 See generally I.C. § 19-
2522. 
Therefore, since the record does not address the treatment alternative, in 
particular, the potential for a psychotropic medication regimen (which could help resolve 
the major issue underlying Mr. Childers' actions), nor does it provide information on the 
risks and benefits of treatment as opposed to continued nontreatment, the record does 
not satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). By not ensuring that those 
requirements are addressed in the record by ordering a psychiatric evaluation, the 
district court has failed to meet its statutory obligation in that regard. Compare Coonts, 
127 Idaho at 153; Banbury, 145 Idaho at 269-270. There is no valid reason for the 
district court to forgo that evaluation since Mr. Childers' mental condition was put 
squarely at issue in sentencing by his attorney before the sentencing hearing and it did 
play a role in the actions underlying the charges in this case. As such, the district 
court's denial of Mr. Childers' request for a psychiatric evaluation constituted an 
abuse of its discretion and a failure to meet its statutory obligation in this regard. 
8 Mr. Childers recognizes that victims are afforded certain rights in criminal proceedings. 
See, e.g., I.C. § 19-5306. As such, it may have been appropriate for the district court to 
hear the victims' statements at that time, but Mr. Childers contends that in order for the 
district court to still satisfy its statutory obligation under I.C. §19-2522, it would have 
then had to continue the hearing until that report could be prepared and submitted. He 
also asserts that none of the victim's rights should be allowed to trump or otherwise 
retard his constitutional or statutory rights or circumvent statutory obligations imposed 
on the district court, particularly if the only justification for doing so is convenience. 
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See Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822; McFarland, 125 Idaho at 879. This Court should 
remedy that error. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Childers respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and 
remand his case for resentencing after the necessary evaluation has been performed. 
DATED this 19th day of July, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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